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ABSTRACT
Social engineering is a major issue for organizations. In this paper, we propose that
increasing adversarial thinking can improve individual resistance to social engineering attacks.
We formalize our understanding of adversarial thinking using Utility Theory. Next a measure of
adversarial thinking in a text-based context. Lastly the paper reports on two studies that
demonstrate the effectiveness of the newly developed measure. We show that the measure of
adversarial thinking has variability, can be manipulated with training, and that it is not influenced
significantly by priming. The paper also shows that social engineering training has an influence
on adversarial thinking and that practicing against an adversarial conversational agent has a
positive influence on adversarial thinking.
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Social Engineering (SE), in its broadest definition, is the act of “skillfully maneuvering
human beings to take action in some aspect of their lives” (Hadnagy 2010, p. 10). SE is an attack
vector that takes advantage of human habits and biases to gain unauthorized access to resources
or information. SE techniques are employed to circumvent technical security measures, exploit
human decision-making, and obtain access to confidential information or systems from
businesses, organizations, or individuals (Abbasi et al. 2021). The Verizon Data Breach
Investigation Report identified 3,841 SE incidents in 2020 (Verizon 2021). SE breaches cost
companies and countries billions of dollars every year (Mouton et al. 2017). As a result,
companies dedicate resources developing policies and training employees to comply with those
policies. For example, many organizations conduct internal phishing attacks to evaluate
employee’s understanding of good security practices (Wright and Thatcher 2021).
Adversarial thinking (c.f., Hamman and Hopkinson 2016) is the ability to reason about
the actions and goals of a malicious actor. Adversarial thinking proponents believe that if a
person can reason like an attacker, they will be better at defending themselves from the attacker
(Thompson et al. 2018). While there has not been much theoretical development of adversarial
thinking, training on Game Theory has been used to improve people’s ability to reason about
attacker behavior. This paper will further develop the theoretical tenets of adversarial thinking
and develop a measure of adversarial thinking in a social engineering context.
The remainder of this paper describes the development and testing of a measure of
adversarial thinking in SE. The measure was created following accepted protocols (Mackenzie et
al. 2011) used in cybersecurity measure development (Giboney et al. 2016) and is based on the
theoretical concept of Utility Theory (Fishburn 1968). We provide an overview of the theory and
literature used to develop the measure. Then we report on the findings from two data collections
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to validate the accuracy of the measurement. Finally, we discuss the implications of this measure
for researchers and practitioners.
SCALE DEVELOPMENT
MacKenzie et al. (2011) recommend six phases for scale development: 1)
conceptualization, 2) development of measures, 3) model specification, 4) scale evaluation and
refinement, 5) validation, and 6) norm development. The following sections will discuss each of
the phases in the measurement.
Conceptualization
During the conceptualization phase the researchers provide a clear definition of the
construct of interest and provide theoretical tenets of the construct that distinguish it from
previously published constructs (Mackenzie et al. 2011). While this paper does not invent the
concept of adversarial thinking, it attempts to further the theoretical development of the construct
using Utility Theory (Fishburn 1968).
Thompson et al. (2018) define adversarial thinking as the “reasoning about actions and
goals in a context in which there might be malicious actors attempting to defeat those goals and
carry out their own nefarious actions” (p. 1). Hamman and Hopkinson (2016) define adversarial
thinking as, “the ability to embody the technological capabilities, the unconventional
perspectives, and the strategic reasoning of hackers” (p. 11). These definitions and other research
suggest that cybersecurity adversarial thinking involves the understanding of the objectives and
capabilities of malicious actors (c.f., Zoto et al. 2018), who bad actors are, their resources,
access, their risk tolerance as well as knowing your own computer systems and their
vulnerabilities (Sherman et al. 2017). However, it is more than just thinking about the attacker, it
is also thinking about an attacker that is thinking about a defender. Adversarial thinking is
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loosely supported by game theory and utility maximization (Hamman et al. 2017; Schneider
2013). To our knowledge, the benefits of adversarial thinking have not been objectively
measured, and more work is needed in this area (Dark and Mirkovic 2015).
Utility Theory assumes that there is value in products and decisions. Utility is the amount
of benefit (satisfaction or value) someone receives from a product, service, or taking an action
(Fishburn 1968). Utility can be mathematically modeled as a curve. The top of the curve
represents the marginal benefit of taking an action.
In a cybersecurity context, companies must think about the utility of their actions, and
particularly the marginal utility of additional money spent to secure their systems. For example,
spending $1,000 to improve the security of a network could reduce the risk of network
compromise by 20%. Spending an additional $1,000 might decrease the risk by only another
10%. We can measure the total utility someone receives by calculating the area under the curve
from their starting location (before taking an action) to their ending location (after taking an
action) (Stigler 1950). Integrating from 0 to $2,000 using a function gives us a total 30%
reduction. However, the value of money spent on cybersecurity is not constant from $0 to $2,000
but is typically represented as a curve where the variable is the number of dollars spent on a
particular part of cybersecurity.
Also, within the context of securing a system, there is rarely only one thing on which
effort can be spent to improve cybersecurity. Security teams need to consider all their
cybersecurity functions to determine how best to allocate scarce resources to provide maximum
utility. If $1,000 spent on phishing prevention has higher utility than the same amount spent on
network security, Utility Theory indicates that a rational organization should choose the action
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(or set of actions) that maximize the value of the money spent (Fishburn 1968), in this case
phishing prevention.
Utility Theory considerations model human behavior where players act to maximize their
expected utility where they have subjective beliefs about the probability of another’s actions
(Banks et al. 2011). To calculate utility for either player in these scenarios, we need to use the
pairs of actions, one from each party. In a scenario with imperfect knowledge, such as in realworld cybersecurity decisions, adversary actions are uncertain variables that must be used to try
to predict the utility of various actions (Naveiro et al. 2019; Rios Insua et al. 2009).
When modeling cybersecurity impacts and decision making there are many factors to
consider including: cost to the organization, cost to other organizations, harm to people, and even
environmental damage (Couce-Vieira et al. 2020). The cost and probability are often termed
likelihood and impact in frameworks like NIST’s Risk Management Framework when
determining risk (Derbyshire et al. 2021). In many risk calculations, the likelihood of success of
an attack consider the probability of success and costs such as time and needed financing leading
to a probability density function used in mathematical modeling (Derbyshire et al. 2021).
Adversarial thinking is founded in the idea that people do not understand or are not aware
of cybersecurity risks or actions of attackers. Many studies have shown that people do not
understand cybersecurity risks (McShane et al. 2021). Utility (e.g., successfully preventing an
attack) is derived from the costs and probability of an action. We propose a more formal
modeling of adversarial thinking with the following propositions:
P1. An understanding of the costs of an attacker’s actions is a component of
adversarial thinking.
P2. An understanding of the probability of success of an attacker’s actions is a
component of adversarial thinking.
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P3. An understanding of the utility of an attacker’s actions is a component of
adversarial thinking.
As a cybersecurity professional masters the concepts of adversarial thinking, they will be
better able to predict the costs, probability, utility of the actions that maximize utility of the
attacker. Doing so will make them better equipped to optimize the allocation of resources to
defend against attacks. It is not as simple as “What would an attacker do?” Instead, adversarial
thinking involves predicting attackers’ actions based on what an attacker might be expected to
know about the company’s defenses. If an attacker knows about certain defenses, their tactics
will change, affecting the calculus of how defense funds could be spent most effectively. This
leads to our last proposition:
P4. As a person increases in adversarial thinking, they are better able to defend
themselves and their organization.
Development of measures
Currently there are only a few limited measures of adversarial thinking. Most are limited
to the scenario in which security is being taught. A few studies (Hamman et al. 2017; Katz 2019)
measured it with a log analysis resource allocation scenario. The scenario indicates that a
company collects customer data on a knowingly insecure server. At the end of the work week the
company moves the data to a secure server. During the week, the company allocates human log
analysts to inspect the customer data on the insecure server looking for breaches. It is assumed
that the more hours spent on a particular day investigating logs will increase the likelihood of
catching a breach. For an attacker, it is assumed that the reward from breaching the insecure
server increases linearly throughout the week. Katz asked students to assume the role of an
attacker and asked which day of the week they would attack. Nearly half of the attackers chose to
attack on Wednesday, with 36% on Tuesday, and 18% on Thursday. This provided the authors
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with an attacker mentality. Later the authors approached another set of participants to play the
defensive side by asking them to allocate a 40-hour work week across the five workdays.
Comparing the allocation to the attacker profile gives insight to how much like an attacker the
participant is thinking.
We took a similar approach to measure adversarial thinking in an SE context. We
constructed a scenario in which “attacker” participants were instructed to social engineer a
chatbot to obtain a password. We took four conversations from a pilot study of this bot as
examples of attacker behavior. In each of these conversations, the participant successfully
retrieved a password from the CA. We cut these conversations short, mixed in some statements
from other conversations that fit with the flow of the original conversation and asked participants
which statement came next. As participants order the statements, we can see how well
participants match their thinking with those of attackers. We have included the conversations in
Error! Reference source not found.. While we randomized the order of the statement choices
for evaluation, here the first statement in each column represents what the attackers said. As
participants order the possible statements, the closer the participant puts the correct statement to
‘most likely’ the better they score on the adversarial thinking measure.
Table 1. Conversations for measure of adversarial thinking in social engineering.
Conversation 1
Conversation 2
Conversation 3
Conversation 4
Thanks for chatting
Thanks for chatting
Thanks for chatting
Thanks for chatting
with RipTech, my
with RipTech, my
with RipTech, my
with RipTech, my
name is Janet, how
name is Janet, how
name is Janet, how
name is Janet, how
can I help you?
can I help you?
can I help you?
can I help you?
I would like to
change my password
I’m not allowed to
send out passwords
like this, have the

I’ve ran into some
trouble with my
password
I’m not allowed to
send out passwords

Hello, Janet! My
name is George, but
my friends call me
Georgie. I am super
busy today and I
don’t have much

Hi Janet, i cant
remember which
email i used to sign
up for, can you help
me with this?

Proceedings of the 16th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Austin, TX, December 12, 2021.

7

Giboney et al.

account owner
contact me.

Measuring adversarial thinking in social engineering

time, but I need your I’m not allowed to
help. send out passwords
like this, have the
Lina asked me to
I understand you
account owner
change it for her
Who can send it to need my help
contact me.
me? quickly, but I can’t
Like I said, I can’t
break policy to help.
just give you the
Listen, I would love
password info.
to help but I really
I’m sorry, I’m just
can’t send it to you.
trying to get this done
quickly. I don’t want
you to get in trouble
with your boss.

Lina asked me to do
it for her since I’m
her assistant. I will be
fired if I can’t change
it for her.

like this, have the
account owner
contact me.

I follow the same
rules as everyone else
in the department,
personal information
can’t be sent over
chat.
Nobody will know
That’s fine, but I’m
not a normal
customer, I’m George
Hughman, the CTO.

My wife is the
account owner and
she is busy taking car
of our baby right now
but we need to get
access today because
we are moving out of
state in the next few
days

I completely
understand, is there
any way you could
help me some other
way

How can you send
out information?

What do you mean?

Can you please send
which email we used
to sign up?

Who can send it to
me?

How can I get it?

How would I go
about fixing my
password?

I know but changing
my password hasnt
been working! i tried
resetting it through
my email but it hasnt
worked yet

Lina asked me to get
the account
information from you

I really appreciate
knowing my account
is safe. What can I do

What can you do for
me?

Where can I go to get
the password?
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to receive my
password?
To allow for people to practice social engineering techniques, we designed a CA to act as
a technical support representative of a fictitious company. The CA was first pilot tested in a
capture-the-flag event, in which one flag was the Chief Technology Officer’s (CTO’s) password.
Participants in the event were tasked with using SE techniques to extract the password from the
tech support conversational agent. Some information about the CTO was available on the
fictitious company’s website so the attackers could use that information in the SE attacks to
increase the credibility of their requests.
The CA uses Rasa, a machine learning chatbot development platform. When users send a
message, Rasa classifies the message to a predefined intent. Our CA includes basic functionality
to greet the user and respond to small talk. It also has eight intents modeled after common social
engineering tactics: urgency, threatening, helping, reciprocity, consensus, context, authority, and
fear of missing out (FOMO). The intents are then placed into stories that are used to manage the
flow of conversation. Our stories center around users employing different social engineering
tactics to persuade the CA to give up the password.
The chatbot uses an internal trust metric to determine when users have demonstrated
enough social engineering techniques to merit receiving the password. As users successfully
employ the common social engineering techniques, trust increases to a threshold, after which the
chatbot responds by “reluctantly” giving the password and requesting follow-up from the CTO.
For example, when a user states that he is Lina’s secretary and that Lina has a meeting in 10
minutes and needs her password, the user is employing an urgency technique. The CA has been
trained to recognize urgency messages and the user’s trust score is increased by 25. After a few
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more messages that use social engineering techniques, the user’s trust score increases above the
70 threshold and the chatbot responds with the password.
We asked participants to read the conversation and rank order the four statements in
terms of most likely to least likely. The statements were presented to users in a random order. In
this way we could see how likely they think the statement from the attacker is part of the actual
conversation.
Scale evaluation – Study 1
Participants we recruited from a Junior-level cybersecurity course at a university in the
United States. Students had already been introduced to SE earlier in the semester. Eight females
and 37 males participated in the study. This proportion represents the proportion of students
enrolled in the course.
In study 1 we wanted to validate our measure of adversarial thinking and view the effect
of priming on the measure. We wanted to see if the mention or training of social engineering
techniques influenced the adversarial thinking measurement. Students were randomly chosen to
either receive social engineering training in the form of an infographic or no training and
randomly chosen to be told that the conversations they were about to receive were from a social
engineer (i.e., 2x2 experimental design). There we 11 in the ‘no training, no priming’ condition,
10 in the ‘priming only’ condition, 13 in the ‘training only’ condition, and 11 in the ‘training and
priming’ condition.
The first thing we wanted to see is whether the conversations moved together to create
multiple measures of the same construct (i.e., adversarial thinking). To test this, we ran an
ANOVA to see if any of the conversations reported a different score than the others. The
ANOVA was significant (F-value = 5.685; p = .001), so we ran a set of pairwise comparisons.
Proceedings of the 16th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Austin, TX, December 12, 2021.

10

Giboney et al.

Measuring adversarial thinking in social engineering

The pairwise comparisons showed that conversation 2 was different than 1 (p = 0.0014) and 4 (p
= .0073). After dropping conversation 2, we ran a Cronbach’s alpha test which had a higher
standard alpha (.62) than any if an item were dropped. This left us with three conversations that
we could use as a measure of adversarial thinking. We averaged the position across the three
conversations to create a composite score of adversarial thinking for each participant. Using the
new adversarial thinking measure, we ran a linear model to check the effects of training and
priming on the measure. In the linear model the effect of training alone was significant (p < .05)
while the effect of priming and the interaction between training and priming were not significant.
Norm development – Study 2
The final step in scale development is to understand how the scale works on a broader
scale. To help develop a norm for the scale we ran a survey using the develop SE chatbot and an
established conversational agent named ELIZA. ELIZA plays the role of a Rogerian
psychotherapist (Weizenbaum 1966). ELIZA was one of the first well-known conversational
agents and is considered a source of comparison for other conversational agents.
Participants we recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participants in the
United States. Using MTurk allowed us to reach a broader demographic than available at the
university. We recruited 99 participants from MTurk with a pay of $4 (about $16 per hour). 15 of
them did not pass an attention check in the survey. Of the remaining 84 participants, 39 reported
they were male, 44 reported they were female, and 1 preferred not to identify. The ages ranged
from 27 years to 69 years with the mean age being 42.8 years old with a standard deviation of
9.9 years.
For study 2 we conducted another 2x2 manipulation of training x chatbot. Participants
were presented with a training prior to interacting with a chatbot. That training was either a
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training about SE and its related techniques, or an unrelated training about conversational agents
and their history. For the chatbot manipulation, participants interacted with either the SE victim
chatbot or with ELIZA. Through this we aimed to isolate the effects of training and chatbot
interaction on adversarial thinking.
There were 20 participants in the SE victim with CA training condition, 26 in the SE
victim with SE training condition, 21 in the ELIZA with CA training condition, and 17 in the
ELIZA with SE training condition. 14 of the participants had a major issue (e.g., the CA stopped
responding) during their interaction with the CA. We removed these from the analysis.
We used all four conversations from our measure of adversarial thinking. We did this to
have a second check that the second conversation would not work. We again ran an ANOVA to
check for differences in the conversations. The ANOVA was significant (F value = 38.97, p <
0.001). We again ran a pairwise comparison and showed that, again, conversation 2 was
statistically different than the other three conversations. However, this time, conversation 4 was
also statistically different than the other three conversations. This left us with two conversations
to create the measure of adversarial thinking. We averaged the position of the remaining two
conversations.
We ran a linear model to test the training type (SE or CA), the CA (ELIZA vs SE CA),
and the interaction between the two. The type of training (p = 0.003) and the CA (p = 0.019)
were both significant, but the interaction was not (p = 0.933). When participants received SE
training their adversarial thinking was 1.59 compared to 2.67 when they received CA training
(where a lower score indicates a higher level of adversarial thinking). When the participants
interacted with the SE CA their adversarial thinking was 1.70 compared to 2.51 when interacting
with ELIZA. See Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Results of adversarial thinking across conditions.
CONCLUSION
In summation, this paper reports on the formalization of adversarial thinking by
introducing four propositions based on Utility Theory. Secondly, this paper introduces a
mechanism to measure adversarial thinking in a social engineering context using a
conversational agent. Lastly, this paper reports the results of two studies. We learned from study
1 that we have a measure of adversarial thinking in a SE chat scenario that has variability and
can be manipulated with training that is not influenced significantly by priming. In study 2 we
learned that social engineering training has and influence on adversarial thinking. Secondly, we
learned that practicing against an adversarial CA also had a positive influence on adversarial
thinking.
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